La globalización y el pluralismo cultural y nacional constituyen dos retos importantes para las democracias y el federalismo actuales. En términos generales, tanto la cuestión de la multiculturalidad como la cuestión de la plurinacionalidad han planteado una nueva agenda de temas en el debate democrático. La discusión actual de estos temas ya no se limita al lenguaje de los derechos individuales y a los valores de libertad, igualdad y pluralismo tal como éstos últimos han sido habitualmente entendidos por las corrientes (...) del liberalismo democrático y del constitucionalismo tradicionales. De hecho, podemos decir que esta nueva agenda de temas ha implicado la superación del enfoque tradicional que a menudo consistía en ver los derechos de las minorías como injustos, discriminatorios y moralmente arbitrarios. (shrink)

This chapter links a conception of global justice, moral cosmopolitanism, with plurinational democracies. After giving a brief description of moral cosmopolitanism, I go on to analyse notions of cosmopolitanism and patriotism in Kant's work and the political significance that the notion of unsocial sociability and the Ideas of Pure Reason of Kant's first Critique have for cosmopolitanism. Finally, I analyse the relationship between cosmopolitanism and minority nations based on the preceding sections. I postulate the need for a moral and institutional (...) refinement of democracies and international society that is better able to accommodate national pluralism than has so far been achieved by traditional liberal constitutionalism and cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

In contrast with the progressive dilution of religions predicted by traditional liberal and Marxist approaches, religions remain important for many people, even in Europe, the most secularised continent. In the context of increasingly culturally diverse societies, this calls for a reinterpretation of the secular legacy of the Enlightenment and also for an updating of democratic institutions. This book focuses on a central question: are the classical secularist arrangements well equipped to tackle the challenge of fast-growing religious pluralism? Or should we (...) move to new post-secular arrangements when dealing with pluralism in Europe? Offering an interdisciplinary approach that combines political theory and legal analysis, the authors tackle two interrelated facets of this controversial question. They begin by exploring the theoretical perspective, asking what post-secularism is and looking at its relation to secularism. The practical consequences of this debate are then examined, focusing on case-law through four empirical case studies. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of political theory, philosophy, religion and politics, European law, human rights, legal theory and socio-legal studies. (shrink)

This book addresses the democratic accommodation of national pluralism through federal rules. The key question is: can federalism be a fair and workable way of articulating multinational societies according to revised liberal-democratic patterns? In recent years, scholarly discussion on this issue has undergone a change. Nowadays, the answer to this question is much more complex than the one that traditional political liberalism and federalism used to give us. In the past, these two political approaches usually addressed the question of political (...) pluralism without seriously including national pluralism in the discussion, a theoretical attitude that has often misrepresented and impoverished the moral discussions and the institutional practices of multinational democratic federations. _Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism_ has been awarded the prize for the best book in 2005 by the Spanish Political Science Association. (shrink)

En este artículo abordamos la tesis de Kant sobre la insociable sociabilidad de los humanos y algunos temas conexos como la paz perpetua, el cosmopolitismo y el patriotismo, así como su continuación por parte de Hegel. En la tesis kantiana vemos un marco más adecuado para observar la realidad actual que el ofrecido por muchas de las teorías políticas y sociales más en uso. A pesar de que Kant era sin duda un filósofo moral, la tesis mencionada responde a cierta (...) desconfianza sobrevenida hacia los meros imperativos morales. Estos últimos, por sí mismos, resultan ineficaces para «humanizar a la humanidad ». La racionalidad pasada por el lenguaje es lo que más nos distingue como especie. Sin embargo, probablemente no sea esto lo que más nos constituya como individuos de esta especie. La insociable sociabilidad, que caracteriza la doble pulsión conflictiva y cooperativa de los humanos, supone un concepto- marco que permite pensar mejor las dificultades actuales de las democracias, tanto en la esfera internacional como en el de proceder a una acomodación política estable de su pluralismo interno de carácter cultural y, en su caso, de carácter nacional. Kant y Hegel son filósofos de la historia porque esta última ofrece ejemplos de la superación de muchos conflictos mediante la política. Desde una perspectiva contemporánea, la insociable sociabilidad es un concepto que complementa tanto en sus dimensiones individuales (Kant) como sociopolíticas (Hegel) lo que también resulta ser un rasgo insuperable del mundo contemporáneo: el pluralismo de valores, intereses, e identidades que habitualmente revisten un carácter agonístico y que remiten a componentes emocionales. (shrink)

Antonio Argandoña, Norbert Bilbeny, Victòria Camps, Miquel Calsina, Àngel Castiñeira, Cristian Palazzi, Ferran Requejo, Raimon Ribera, Begoña Román, Ferran Sàez, Miquel Seguró, Francesc Torralba, Josep Maria Vallès, Rosamund Thomas Ramon Llull Journal of Applied Ethics 2012 3(3):9-16.

This volume brings together two philosophical research areas that have been subject to increased attention: work regarding the unique character of having an experience and studies on the nature and powers of imagination. -/- The importance of imagination seems to stand in tension with the assumed unique and irreplaceable role of experience in our lives. However, new arguments in various philosophical debates suggest there is a need to examine how both areas of research interrelate and can enrich one another. The (...) chapters in this volume examine whether the traditional accounts of experience and imagination need to be challenged. They are divided into thematic sections that discuss epistemological, ontological, normative, phenomenological, and intersubjective questions related to experience and imagination. (shrink)

This paper explores “existential envy” as a kind of envy in which the subject targets the rival’s entire being rather than one of her possessions, achievements or talents. It argues that existential envy is characterized by a weakening of the distinction between good and rival and by a strong focus on the envious self. In existential envy, the subject becomes aware that another person is closer to her ideal self than she is, such that the rival painfully reminds her of (...) unfulfilled but now unrealizable possibilities inherent to her being. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper analyzes the intentional object of existential envy, i.e., of what it means that the envier targets the other’s being (section 2). The next section explores existential envy’s focus on the self by examining the series of feelings of diminution in the envier’s own value (section 3). The paper then turns to the set of comparisons between the self and the other and the counterfactual thought “I could have been you!” which is shown to be definitory of this type of envy (section 4). In the final part of the paper, the relation between the envier’s bad self-image, self-reproach, and self-deception is discussed (section 5), before the main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6). (shrink)

Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental (...) history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the study of the emotions in Edith Stein’s early work On the Problem of Empathy. After presenting her work embedded in the tradition of the early phenomenology of the emotions, I shall elaborate the four dimensions of the emotional experience according to this authoress, the link between emotions and values and the phenomenon of the living body. I argue that Stein’s account on empathy remains incomplete as long as we ignore the complex phenomenology of emotions (...) underlying her work. (shrink)

This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...) in the taxonomy of the affective mind (ontology); and 3) the psychological mechanisms responsible for the inversion of value (psychology). The early phenomenological accounts are then analyzed in the light of recent accounts of Ressentiment elaborated by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. It is argued that the early phenomenological accounts provide central insights on the interrelation between affectivity and value. (shrink)

Mikkonen’s new book and his emphasis on understanding should be regarded as an important contribution to the contemporary debate on the cognitive value of literary narratives. As I shall argue, his notion of understanding can also help explain how literature is existentially valuable. In so doing, his account can support a radicalized contemporary neo-cognitivism according to which literature can affect us existentially and lead to a personal transformation.

Why is it that we respond emotionally to plays, movies, and novels and feel moved by characters and situations that we know do not exist? This question, which constitutes the kernel of the debate on »the paradox of fiction«, speaks to the perennial themes of philosophy, and remains of interest to this day. But does this question entail a paradox? A significant group of analytic philosophers have indeed thought so. Since the publication of Colin Radford's celebrated paper »How Can We (...) Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?« (1975), the number of proposals to solve, explain, reformulate, dismiss or even revitalize this apparent paradox has continued to proliferate. In line with recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, in this paper I will argue against the sustainability of the paradox, claiming that the only reasonable way to continue our discussions about it consists in using it as a heuristic tool to shed light on problems regarding our involvement with fiction. Against this background, I will then focus on one of the problems related to how our emotional responses to fiction contribute to our appreciation of it. The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section shows the parallel evolution of the paradox of fiction and the analytic philosophy of emotion. Here I claim that, although the paradox is epistemically flawed, since one of its premises is rooted in a limited view on the emotions typical of early cognitiv-ism, the discussions it provokes are still epistemically useful. As Robert Stecker (2011, 295), among others, has pointed out, the paradox was formulated during the heyday of cognitive theories of the emotions in which emotion necessarily requires belief. Today, however, only few authors would endorse this premise. If emotion does not always require belief (as the majority of authors in the contemporary debate admit), let alone belief about the existence of the object towards which it is directed, then there is no reason to speak of a paradox. From this first conclusion, however, it does not follow that the paradox is completely without use from the epistemic point of view. A glimpse at the topics touched on during the discussions about how to solve, reformulate, or negate the paradox reveals their value in shedding light on the interrelation between emotion and fiction. The second section elaborates a phenomenologically inspired cognitive account of the emotions by focusing on their cognitive bases, their influence on Emotion in the Appreciation of Fiction 205 cognitions, and their cognitive function. In this model, emotions are responsible for indicating values, for showing what matters to us, and for being appropriate to their objects. My claim is that this view applies not only to reality, but also to our involvement with fiction. In the final section I draw on this account to focus on one kind of appreciation of fiction which necessarily requires our emotional involvement. Following an idea put forward by Susan Feagin (1996, 1), I employ the concept of »appre-ciation« to refer to a set of abilities exercised with the aim of extracting value from the work. There is a long tradition in aesthetics that condemns any focus on the emotions in the appreciation of art and fiction, and defends the necessity of aesthetic appreciation without emotional influence. To refer to this negative attitude towards the emotions, I will borrow an expression coined by Susan Feagin (2013, 636), who refers to »the intellectualized view of appreciation«. Against this widespread view, I will argue that some aspects of the fiction can only be appreciated with the help of our emotions. The cognitive approach developed in the previous section can explain how the emotions might in fact play a significant role in the appreciation of art and fiction. Attention will be paid to three activities involved in appreciation, for all of which emotion is crucial: processing relevant information about the fictional world, understanding aspects of it, and becoming acquainted with the values it presents. My aim here is to argue that there are particular aspects of the fictional world that can only be appreciated if recipients have the appropriate emotions. (shrink)

This paper explores self-envy as a kind of envy in which the subject targets herself. In particular, I argue that self-envy should be regarded as a variation of existential envy, i. e., envy directed toward the rival’s entire existence, though in the case of self-envy, the rival is oneself. The paper starts by showing that self-envy is characterized by an apparent weakening of envy’s triangular structure insofar as the subject, the rival, and the good coincide in the self. After discussing (...) an interpretation of self-envy in terms of a splitting of the self, I present an alternative explanation in terms of the ontological possibilities inherent in our actual and past empirical selves to become our ideal self. I argue that in self-envy, an actual empirical self envies her past empirical self for having more ontological possibilities of becoming her ideal self. I proceed to show that self-envy can be interpreted as a variety of existential envy. I argue that the existential self-reproach so characteristic of self-envy can be counterbalanced by feeling unconditionally loved by others and God. (shrink)

Antonio Argandoña, Norbert Bilbeny, Victòria Camps, Miquel Calsina, Àngel Castiñeira, Cristian Palazzi, Ferran Requejo, Raimon Ribera, Begoña Román, Ferran Sàez, Miquel Seguró, Francesc Torralba, Josep Maria Vallès, Rosamund Thomas Ramon Llull Journal of Applied Ethics 2012 3(3):9-16.

Contemporary accounts on fictional emotions, i.e., emotions experienced towards objects we know to be fictional, are mainly concerned with explaining their rationality or lack thereof. In this context dominated by an interest in the role of belief, questions regarding their phenomenal quality have received far less attention: it is often assumed that they feel “similar” to emotions that target real objects. Against this background, this paper focuses on the possible specificities of fictional emotions’ qualitative feel. It starts by presenting what (...) I call the “phenomenological question” about the qualitative feel of fictional emotions (section 1) and by showing that this is irreducible to questions about their cognitive, intentional, evaluative, and embodied nature (section 2). Drawing on some insights from early phenomenologists, the next two sections elaborate criteria to distinguish between real and sham emotions on the one side (section 3) and between genuine and non-genuine emotions on the other (section 4). Finally, I apply this orthogonal distinction to the particular case of fictional emotions (section 5). The paper argues that fictional emotions are neither sham emotions nor quasi-emotions, but full-fledged emotional experiences, despite them displaying the distinctive phenomenology of emotions experienced as non-genuine. In the particular case of fictional emotions, they are non-genuine because our psychology is in fact in a state dominated by aesthetic enjoyment. (shrink)

Moritz Geiger’s 1911 article on the consciousness of feeling, entitled “Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen,” was an object of study for Husserl in a series of manuscripts recently published in Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins II. Gefühl und Wert (1896–1925) (2020). Geiger’s article and Husserl’s remarks on it received attention from Métraux (1975), but, more recently, an increasing number of publications have been devoted to the topic (Averchi, 2015a, 2015b; Crespo, 2015; Quepons, 2017; Marcos del Cano, 2023). These new publications identify (...) a central area of disagreement between the two authors concerning the nature of emotive consciousness, i.e., the mode in which affective states relate to their objects. For Geiger, emotions are directed toward their objects but are not regarded as intentional and, in certain forms of consciousness, can even lose their relation to their objects. By contrast, for Husserl, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of emotive consciousness. The aim of this paper is to place the authors’ disagreement in a broader historical context and to show that it reveals profound differences between their respective ontologies of the mind and the place of feeling within it. -/- . (shrink)

If, as argued in some simulationist accounts, empathy aims at grasping the phenomenal richness of the other’s experience and resonating with it, it is difficult to explain our empathy with emotions that we have never experienced ourselves. According to a long philosophical tradition, imagination is constrained by experience. We have to be acquainted with the qualitative feel of the other’s experience in order to imagine it. A critical view of simulationist accounts would claim that if we cannot imagine how the (...) other feels because we are not acquainted with it, empathy cannot take place. Contrary to such criticism, this paper takes a moderately optimistic view of the simulationist claim. It develops a model to explain how we imagine the other’s emotions by drawing on phenomenal concepts, affective memories, and imaginative scaffoldings. I argue that this model can explain how we empathize with the other’s emotions regardless of whether these are familiar or novel to us. However, in the latter case, the imagined phenomenal quality is not identical but probably only similar to the other’s emotion. This similarity suffices for us to speak about empathy. (shrink)

Often in our everyday lives, for instance, in decision-taking, empathizing with others, and engaging with fictions, we are able to imagine what a particular emotion feels like. This chapter analyzes the structure of these imaginings as a kind of experiential imagining. After introducing the topic (section 1), I argue that these imaginings cannot be explained exclusively by their content and that a focus on the mode of imagining is required. We not only imagine having emotions, but we also imagine them (...) experientially, and this means that we imagine feeling them (section 2). I proceed to analyze the content of such imaginings in terms of the phenomenal properties of emotions undergone from a particular subjective perspective within the imagined scenario (section 3). Next, I argue that the mode in which such emotions are experientially imagined requires other-oriented perspective-shifting and the recreation of an emotion-like state (section 4). I examine how we recreate emotion-like states in two cases: when the emotion has been previously felt (section 5) and when it has not been previously experienced (section 6). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 7). (shrink)

A very basic form of experience consists in feeling energetic, vital, alive, tired, dispirited, vigorous and so on. These feelings – which I call feelings of vitality or vital feelings – constitute the main concern of this paper. My aim is to argue that these feelings exhibit a distinctive form of affectivity which cannot be explained in terms of emotions, moods, background feelings or existential feelings and to explore different paths for their conceptualization. The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing (...) the topic (sect. 1), I show that these feelings cannot be subsumed under any of the current categories of the affective mind (sect. 2). Against this backdrop, I present and critically assess Scheler’s notion of vital feelings as an alternative model for capturing their distinctive nature (sect. 3). Next, I explore varieties of vital feelings by focusing on different levels of the bodily-felt experience (sect. 4) and analyze their specific form of self-involvement (sect. 5). Finally, I conclude by showing how the study of vital feelings might contribute to phenomenological bioethics (sect. 6). (shrink)

RESUMENDurante los últimos años, la filosofía analítica ha centrado su interés en la temática de las emociones y se han elaborado las más diversas teorías. En este artículo me propongo, por un lado, exponer las principales líneas de investigación actuales sobre las emociones y desarrollar los argumentos en favor y en contra cada una de ellas con el fin de perfilar mi propia posición; por otro lado, voy a presentar los desarrollos históricos precedentes a las teorías analíticas mostrando que la (...) historia de la filosofía no ha relegado las emociones al olvido.PALABRAS CLAVEEMOCIÓN, FILOSOFÍA ANALÍTICA, TEORÍAS DEL SENTIR, TEORÍAS COGNITIVISTAS.ABSTRACTEmotions are one of the topics that have caught the attention of analytical philosophy during the past years, and philosophers have developed different theories in this field. In this article, I shall present the main lines of investigation in the current debate on emotions and explain the arguments in favour and against each of them in order to build up my own position on the one hand, and, present the historical developments previous to the analytical theories, showing that the history of philosophy has always had an interest in emotions as a topic on the other hand.KEY WORDSEMOTION, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, FEELING THEORIES, COGNITIVISTIC THEORIES. (shrink)

In this article I show the relevance of early phenomenology for the understanding of sociality by focusing on one element of pivotal importance: the phenomenological idea that affective phenomena are intentionally directed towards the world and others, and reveal what matters to us and what motivates us to action. This phenomenological idea of intentional feelings is amalgamated in the newly-coined concept of ‘affective intentionality’. The article focuses on three aspects of this concept: (i) the fact that our emotional intentional directedness (...) towards the world and the others is socially embedded, (ii) that it is socially shaped, and (iii) that it can assume shared forms. The thread that runs through this article is the idea that the analysis of affectivity is decisive for offering new perspectives on the interconnection between the individual and the social. I develop this idea by focusing on the phenomena of feelings and sentiments analysed respectively by Scheler and Pfänder. The result of this analysis lends further support to the idea of a relational concept of intentionality in early phenomenology, and gives key insight into the early phenomenological contribution to the social sciences. The analysis shows that a phenomenological sociology cannot be developed independently of a value-ethics. (shrink)

This paper offers an overview of certain key features of the accounts of emotion defended by the early phenomenologists. After briefly presenting the movement of early phenomenology and describing its historical context, I shall elaborate the main claims about the emotions defended by this group, articulating them through the following five topics: 1) the stratification of emotional life; 2) the qualitative aspect of emotional experience; 3) the foundation of the emotions in cognitive acts; 4) the intentionality of feeling and the (...) emotions; and 5) their moral dimension. The paper finishes with some concluding remarks about the significance of the early phenomenological discussion of the emotions for the debate on this topic in contemporary analytical philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores how individuals experiencing hostile affective states such as envy, jealousy, hate, contempt, and Ressentiment tend to deceive themselves about their own mental states. More precisely, it examines how the feeling of being diminished in worth experienced by the subject of these hostile affective states motivates a series of self-deceptive maneuvers that generate a fictitious upliftment of the subject’s sense of self. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper explores the main arguments that explain why several hostile (...) affective states involve a feeling of diminution in the subject’s own value (section 2). Next, it offers an analysis of how the negative feeling of self-worth motivates self-deception. While in extrinsically motivated self-deception, the subject feels diminished in worth after negatively evaluating her own hostile affective states, in intrinsically motivated self-deception, the negative feelings of self-worth are constituent elements of the hostile affective state in question (section 3). Cases of intrinsically motivated self-deception are particularly intriguing because in them the motivation for self-deception is inherent to the hostile affective state, independently of external reasons. I coin the expression “self-deceptive style” to capture the distinctive form in which each hostile affective state intrinsically motivates changes in the architecture of the mind (e.g., perception, imagining, memory, judgment, attention, etc.) in order to generate an upliftment of the self (section 4). To show the descriptive and explanatory function of this concept, a comparative analysis of the self-deceptive styles of envy and hate is provided (section 5). The conclusion summarizes the main findings and explores directions for further research (section 6). (shrink)

Often in our everyday lives, for instance, in decision-taking, empathizing with others, and engaging with fictions, we are able to imagine what a particular emotion feels like. This chapter analyzes the structure of these imaginings as a kind of experiential imagining. After introducing the topic (section 1), I argue that these imaginings cannot be explained exclusively by their content and that a focus on the mode of imagining is required. We not only imagine having emotions, but we also imagine them (...) experientially, and this means that we imagine feeling them (section 2). I proceed to analyze the content of such imaginings in terms of the phenomenal properties of emotions undergone from a particular subjective perspective within the imagined scenario (section 3). Next, I argue that the mode in which such emotions are experientially imagined requires other-oriented perspective-shifting and the recreation of an emotion-like state (section 4). I examine how we recreate emotion-like states in two cases: when the emotion has been previously felt (section 5) and when it has not been previously experienced (section 6). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 7). (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Unamuno’s narrative fictions as thought experiments about self and emotion. I begin by developing a notion of thought experiment consequent with his understanding of philosophy as a form of literature. Next, I focus on the philosophy of the emotions implicit in his major essay Del Sentimiento trágico de la vida. The third section offers a case study in the form of envy in the novel Abel Sánchez. The final section addresses different forms of knowledge about (...) the emotions conveyed by Unamuno’s fictional works. (shrink)

This paper examines the notion of aesthetic pleasure within the framework of an aesthetics of value. The topic is introduced in sect. 1, while sect. 2 presents Moritz Geiger’s distinction between two kinds of aesthetic pleasure: liking, which enables us to grasp the aesthetic values of the artwork; and enjoyment, which is understood to be an emotional response. Sect. 3 reassesses the main tenets of Geiger’s account in the light of current research. In particular, I provide arguments in favor of (...) Geiger’s distinction between liking and enjoyment, but I call into question the claim that liking reveals aesthetic values. In sect. 4, I suggest that liking is a form of feeling motivated by the cognition of aesthetic value and I distinguish it from both the grasping of values and emotional responses. I conclude in sect. 5 by briefly summarizing my main claims. (shrink)

This paper explores one of Unamuno's most challeng-ing short stories: Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (1918). In this text, Unamuno deals with an experience for which he coins the expression ›self-envy‹. Is ›self-envy‹ conceptually sound? Or is it an unsuitable phrase for an emotional state that has nothing to do with envy? The paper proceeds in three steps in order to answer these questions. After presenting Unamuno’s Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (section 1), the following section considers the notion of self-envy, which I interpret as a (...) singular but instructive case of envy (section 2). My attention then turns to a more general emotional state, which I interpret using the concept of akratic emotion (section 3). The paper concludes with some considerations as to the use of literature as a form of thought experiment for philosophical purposes. In sum, I show that Artemio can be efectively read as a thought experiment in relation to envy and akrasia, i.e., the state of acting against one’s better judgement. (shrink)

One important aspect of Nussbaum´s thesis on the moral value of literature concerns the power of literature to enhance our ability to empathise with other minds. This aspect will be the focus of the current article. My aim is to reflect upon this question regarding the moral value of our empathy for fictional characters. The article is structured in two main parts. I will first examine the concept of “empathy” and distinguish between empathy for human beings and empathy for fictional (...) characters. I will call the latter “literary empathy”. In the second part of the paper I will examine the arguments for and against the double thesis that reading literature enhances our ability to feel empathy, and that feeling empathy prompts altruistic behaviour. (shrink)

This paper explores Moritz Geiger’s work on the role of emotions in aesthetic appreciation and shows its potential for contemporary research. Drawing on the main tenets of Geiger’s phenomenological aesthetics as an aesthetics of value, the paper begins by elaborating his model of aesthetic appreciation. I argue that, placed in the contemporary debate, his model is close to affective models which make affective states responsible for the apprehension of the aesthetic value of an artwork, though Geiger also makes important concessions (...) to the intellectualist. Indeed, like proponents of the affective model, Geiger argues that a work’s aesthetic values are extracted by means of an affective state though the affective state in question is neither an emotion nor a feeling but a “liking”. In fact, like the intellectualist, he considers that a focus on the emotions might on certain occasions interfere in the aesthetic appreciation of the artwork. Next, I reconstruct Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in terms of a distinction between two types of emotional responses to artworks. It is argued that Geiger’s distinction offers a powerful tool to distinguish those emotions that are intrinsically related to aesthetic values from those that are not and that this distinction can be useful to understand how different kinds of emotions contribute to aesthetic appreciation. I proceed to examine the historical sources of Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in Theodor Lipps’s aesthetics and compare Geiger’s account with the works of other early phenomenologists working on values. In the final part, I illustrate the place of Geiger’s model in the contemporary discussion by means of an example. (shrink)

This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of contempt. To this end, I will focus on four main features of this emotion. 1) In the first section, applying the phenomenological methodology to the case of contempt, I will distinguish the structure of this emotion from the structure of similar negative affective phenomena. Attention will be paid especially to the relation between contempt and hatred. 2) The emotional experience of contempt is analyzed in the next section acknowledging three main dimensions: quality, valence, (...) and expression. 3) The third section undertakes an analysis of the cognitive content of contempt focusing on its judgmental structure and its intentional objects. 4) In the last section, I discuss the role of contempt in moral life. Against recent defenses of this emotion, I argue that contempt is morally wrong. (shrink)

This paper explores jealousy in Unamuno’s drama El otro. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion, I will argue that for the Spanish author jealousy gives the subject a sense of self. The paper begins by embedding Unamuno’s philosophical anthropology in the context of contemporary emotion theory. It then presents the drama as an investigation into the affective dimension of self-identity. The third section offers an analysis of jealousy as an emotion of self-assessment. The final section discusses how this drama can (...) be regarded as a piece of philosophical work. (shrink)

This paper argues that certain literary works can only be fully appreciated if the reader is able to experience through empathy the character’s values. I call it "the axiological account" because it makes the grasping of aesthetic values dependent on the experience of other values embodied in the work. I develop my argument in three stages. First, I argue that in empathy we not only apprehend but also experience something similar to what the target is going through. Next, I show (...) how this experience is necessary to extract the aesthetic values of certain works. The final section addresses two challenges to the proposed account. (shrink)

In this letter from Ireland I give a brief introduction into the history of academic philosophy in Ireland and a schematic overview of the current philosophical landscape. I point out some advantages and some disadvantages of practicing philosophy in Ireland against Germany and put those into a general historical and cultural context. Finally, I provide key information for anybody interested in finding out more about philosophy in Ireland.

In the current aesthetic debate fictional emotions has been seen as a challenge for rationality. In this essay I shall examine the notion of “rationality of the emotions” from six different points of view: its cognitive basis, its intentionality, its ability to influence thoughts, its motivational force, its contribution to adaptation and maximization of wellbeing. The aim is to demonstrate that fictional emotions are completely integrated in the paradigm of rationality.

This paper examines the dynamic of belittlement and self-affirmation that is characteristic of hate. It argues that in hate we respond to a belittlement of our feeling of self-worth with an extreme form of self-affirmation which consists in regarding the other as evil and as deserving of being annihilated. Analyzing the origins and causes of hate, I develop a taxonomy of its main forms and distinguish between retributive, normative, malicious, and ideological hate. I show that all forms of hate aim (...) at increasing our feeling of self-worth. This common aim, however, is not always achieved: while retributive and normative hate can lead to an enhancement of one’s feeling of self-worth, in malicious and ideological hate such enhancement remains illusory and subject to self-deception. Finally, I argue that hate can never be morally justified. (shrink)

This paper discusses the question about the nature of values and how we experience them from the point of view of moral phenomenology. Two senses of this term are distinguished: a historical sense and a methodological one. The paper analyses first the experience of values by focussing on affective acts such as feelings, emotions, desires and volitions. Two different versions of the thesis, their arguments, and counter arguments are then examined: Dispositionalism and Realism. Both can be found in the tradition (...) of the Brentano school including that taken up by his pupils from the Graz school, in phenomenology, and in current Metaethics. Finally I argue that value dispositionalism is a better option to understand the experience of value. (shrink)

This essay examines the early reception of Scheler’s anthropological thought in Spain. The article traces the two main ways of reception of Scheler’s work in the School of Madrid and the School of Barcelona. I argue that, on the one hand, the Spanish translations of the works of the early phenomenologists – Scheler was a central figure among them – contributed to the diffusion of Scheler’s thought; and that, on the other hand, the Spanish authors subjected Scheler’s thought to a (...) critical assimilation and further developments. Scheler influenced the Spanish philosophy of the human affectivity, in which the capacity to feel, the values and love as a kernel of the human being occupy an exceptional position. This reception shows the originality of Spanish authors that incorporate Scheler’s ideas to their anthropological interest and develop these ideas in the direction of their own phenomenological anthropology. (shrink)